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Revival of Aggregate Demand Policies – Introduction 
Roel Beetsma∗ and Gerhard Illing∗∗ 
This issue contains a selection of the papers presented at the workshop “The 
Revival of Aggregate Demand Policies: Back to Keynes” that took place in 
Venice in July 2004. During recent years, there has been growing consensus 
that monetary policy can work as an effective stabilisation mechanism. Using 
formal (dynamic) general equilibrium models based on micro-foundations, the 
so-called New Keynesian approach – the workhorse of modern macroeconom-
ics – provides sophisticated tools for exploring the implications of monetary 
policy. Whereas the academic literature, until recently, focused mainly on 
monetary policy, it is now paying increasing attention to the fiscal side of 
aggregate demand management. This conference issue aims to provide a 
critical appraisal and extension of that literature, focusing both on fiscal and 
monetary aspects. 
Recently, fiscal policy has become popular again among policymakers as a 
stabilisation tool. Tax cuts in the U.S. have been partly motivated by the 
argument that they would stimulate the economy by increasing demand. 
Similarly, the protracted sluggishness of the German and French economies 
has led to tax reductions. Given that in the Euro Area monetary policy no 
longer responds to national shocks, many call for a stronger role of fiscal 
policy as a stabilisation tool. Not so long ago the French President Chirac and 
the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder jointly called for setting up large 
infrastructural projects to revive the European economy. While such projects 
affect the supply-side in the longer run by boosting European productive 
capacity, the short-run effect would be an increase in employment, hence 
income and spending, and thus a boost to aggregate demand. 
For a long time, academic researchers have been sceptical about aggregate 
fiscal demand management on the ground that fiscal fine-tuning is impossible 
due to decision and implementation lags, as well as uncertainty about the way 
the economy works. But their interest in the effects of fiscal policy impulses 
has recently been revived. Samples of recent contributions are Burnside et al. 
(2003), who look at the effects of major shocks to military spending in the 
U.S., Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who use detailed institutional information 
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on tax elasticities and tax collection lags to identify discretionary fiscal policy 
changes, and Perotti (2005), who tackles the same issue in an empirical analy-
sis for major OECD economies. Other recent contributions in this area are 
Fatas and Mihov (2001), Canova and Pappa (2002), Marcellino (2002), 
Mountfort and Uhlig (2002) and Favero (2003). Giuliodori and Beetsma 
(2004) extend the issue into another direction and look at the cross-border 
trade spill-over effects of a fiscal stimulus in large European economies. 
At this juncture it becomes important to explain what we mean by aggregate 
demand management. As far as monetary policy is concerned, many research-
ers assume that it is conducted by some rule, usually one in which the short-
run interest rate (the monetary authority’s instrument) is linked to inflation or 
expected future inflation and some measure of economic activity (as in the 
well-known “Taylor rule”). Deviations from this rule are often interpreted as 
discretionary monetary policy changes. For fiscal policy, matters are more 
complicated. Fiscal policy (taxes and spending) is to a large extent automati-
cally determined by movements in economic activity (a boom raises revenues 
and reduces spending on, for instance, unemployment) and servicing costs of 
public debt (especially for high-debt countries). On top of that, the authorities 
may follow some rule in which they systematically link revenues and spending 
to, for example, movements in public debt (an increase in debt might be met 
with an increase in the primary surplus).1 Deviations of taxes and spending 
from the values determined by automatic responses in activity and systematic 
policy responses to economic developments would qualify as discretionary 
fiscal policy changes. Examples of discretionary fiscal policy changes are 
increases in U.S. defence spending to finance the Iraq invasion or the recent 
additional spending cuts introduced by the Dutch government as a result of an 
unforeseen budgetary deterioration. The papers in this issue analyse to what 
extent systematic rules and/or discretionary policy responses can or should be 
designed as tools for aggregate demand management. 
While the New Keynesian approach has mainly been used to explore the 
implications of monetary policy, attempts are now also being made at intro-
ducing fiscal policy into the framework.2 Torben Andersen discusses the 
need and scope for active fiscal stabilization policy in that context. A number 
of factors determine the answer to these questions. First, it is crucial whether 
activity is supply-determined or demand-determined. Under a demand-
determined activity level lower than the capacity level, an increase in public 
consumption raises activity in the short run. In fact, as Andersen points out, it 
is important to realise that the short-run effect of a fiscal expansion may differ 
                                                          
1  Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) estimate fiscal rules of this type. 
2  For instance, see Beetsma and Jensen (2004; 2005) and Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). 
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substantially from the long-run effect. Even if the latter is negative, there could 
still be a case for a fiscal stimulus, as long as it is temporary.  
Another factor to be taken into account is the instrument that might be most 
effective in stimulating activity. When Ricardian equivalence holds, changes in 
taxes have no effect, while an increase in public consumption stimulates 
activity, although at the cost of some crowding out of private consumption. 
Only if the spending stimulus is short-lived, then the crowding-out effect is 
small. In contrast, in the presence of liquidity constraints, a tax reduction 
boosts output by raising disposable income for those who are constrained. An 
additional decisive factor is the role of expectations, much like in the case of 
monetary policy. For example, a temporary policy measure which is actually 
perceived as permanent, will largely lose its effectiveness, because the private 
sector increases its saving in anticipation of the substantially higher future 
taxes. Fiscal contractions may lead to expectations of a reduction of the size of 
the public sector and, therefore, could have an expansive effect on the econ-
omy (for example, Giavazzi and Pagano 1990).  
Information requirements, as well as the potential for political abuse, cause 
Andersen to be sceptical about the desirability of active fiscal stabilisation 
policy. He argues that proposals to delegate stabilisation policy to independent 
institutions (such as a “fiscal board”) will run into serious difficulties since it 
might be inefficient to separate stabilisation, allocation and distribution. 
Automatic stabilisers do not suffer from these weaknesses. Even under a 
balanced budget they may enhance welfare by spreading risks over private and 
public consumption. They become even more effective when the balanced 
budget requirement is relaxed. This would allow smoothing of consumption 
over time, something that might be hard to achieve through private markets. 
Unfortunately, automatic stabilisers have disadvantages, too. They do not 
distinguish between the sources of shocks, neither can they distinguish perma-
nent from temporary shocks. For example, a permanent or very persistent 
adverse shock (such as in the seventies) could lead to systematic, unsustainable 
budget movements that can only be offset with a discretionary fiscal change. 
Anton Muscatelli and Patrizio Tirelli (2005) examine the empirical effects 
of fiscal policy in New-Keynesian models. They show that introducing addi-
tional features can improve the empirical performance of the models. They 
allow for habit persistence in consumption, a fraction of rule-of-thumb con-
sumers, price stickiness, a share of firms that index their prices to inflation, 
government expenditures, and taxation effects on consumption and firms’ 
marginal costs. The models they consider are a single-country model with 
infinitely-lived consumers (hence Ricardian equivalence holds), a single-
country model with finitely-lived consumers, so that Ricardian equivalence 
breaks down and public debt affects economic allocations and, finally, a two-
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country model of a monetary union. The models feature simple monetary and 
fiscal rules. Monetary policy follows an inertial Taylor-like rule in which the 
interest rate responds to expected future inflation and output gaps. Fiscal 
policy follows backward-looking rules, linking government consumption and 
taxes to their own lagged values and the past output gap. The two-country 
version of the model also assumes that spending and taxes are linked to public 
debt, which could represent the presence of a fiscal restriction like Europe’s 
Stability and Growth Pact. These fiscal rules might be interpreted as combin-
ing an automatic stabilizer component (in particular, as far as the link with the 
output gap is concerned) with a discretionary component. The model parame-
ters are partly calibrated and partly based on estimates from previous studies. 
For both demand and supply shocks the authors simulate different versions of 
the models to examine the transmission of fiscal policy. First, they study the 
single country models. Complementing the monetary rule with the fiscal rule 
only has a minor additional stabilising effect. An increase in the number of 
rule-of-thumb consumers, even though it improves the scope for fiscal policy, 
reduces the degree of stabilisation. This is due to the fact that monetary policy 
becomes less potent because the impact of an interest rate change on aggregate 
demand diminishes (as the consumption of the rule-of-thumbers is insensitive 
to the interest rate). Assuming finite rather than infinite lives makes fiscal 
policy more powerful, as Ricardian equivalence is broken. However, while 
initial stabilisation is larger, adjustment towards the steady state is no longer 
monotonic, but takes place in cycles. Translating the results into unconditional 
standard deviations for inflation and output, it is found that, in the case of 
supply shocks, adding fiscal policy reduces output volatility at the cost of 
increased inflation volatility. Hence, fiscal policy reveals the same trade off 
that monetary policy faces in the presence of supply shocks. Not surprisingly, 
given the higher steady-state share of taxation, the impact of fiscal policy in 
Europe is larger than in the U.S. 
Simulations for the two-country monetary union show that fiscal policy in the 
presence of a unilateral positive demand shock becomes less potent. The 
reason is that the ensuing monetary contraction by the common central bank 
pushes the other economy into recession. This country will therefore expand 
its fiscal policy, thereby offsetting part of the contractive effect of the fiscal 
policy in the shock-hit economy.  
In his paper, Jordi Galí surveys his recent research on two central themes of 
Keynesian economics, namely the social waste associated with recessions and 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. The availability of 
formal (dynamic) modelling methods based on micro-foundations, as em-
ployed by real business cycle theorists, has reinvigorated the analysis of the 
consequences of price and wage rigidities. While RBC theorists view business 
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cycles are the result of the economy’s optimal response to shocks, the Keynes-
ian view is that these cycles are associated with variations in the efficiency 
with which productive resources are used. Recessions are thus periods of 
increased waste of such resources, so that public policy can play a useful role. 
One of the features of (many) New-Keynesian economics is that the output gap 
should be defined as the difference between actual output and the efficient 
output level that prevails under fully flexible wages and prices. Galí splits this 
gap into a component that captures inefficiencies in product markets (due to 
imperfect competition) and another one that arises from distortions in the 
labour market (such as non-competitive wage-setting and distortionary taxes 
on labour). A plot of this gap computed for postwar US data reveals two key 
features. The gap, as defined by Galí, is substantially more volatile than 
conventional output gap measures based on a (relatively) smooth trend. The 
other feature is that both Galí’s and the traditional measure are highly corre-
lated, indicating that recessions are indeed periods of increased inefficiency in 
the economy. Further, empirical evidence suggests that variations in the labour 
market wedge are the dominant source of fluctuations in the output gap. 
If inefficiencies drive the output gap, in principle there is a case for policies 
that stimulate aggregate demand. One needs to be careful in distinguishing 
policies that reduce fluctuations around the steady state and policies that aim at 
limiting recessions. While the former lead to only second-order welfare gains, 
the latter lead to first-order welfare gains, given that the steady state is dis-
torted (e.g. because of monopolistic competition). Galí goes on to present a 
simple model in which individuals care about private and public goods con-
sumption, as well as leisure. He derives the optimal level of public purchases 
and shows that they can be used to increase employment, thereby reducing the 
welfare losses caused by an inefficiently low level of economic activity. 
Moreover, the incentive to increase government spending becomes stronger 
the larger is the output gap. 
The final line of work discussed in Galí’s paper looks at the role that discre-
tionary fiscal policy might have had in the decline in GDP volatility over the 
past decades. Martin and Rowthorn (see below) document this decline in detail 
and mainly attribute it to better monetary policies. However, the substantial 
increase in the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy claimed by Galí and Perotti 
(2003) suggests that this may have been a contributing factor too. 
The paper by Robert Woods considers the implications for the stabilisation of 
the British economy if Britain were to join the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Obviously, there would be less stabilization through monetary policy, 
since the latter would be linked to average developments in the Euro area. The 
burden on fiscal stabilisation policies would become correspondingly larger. 
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Woods describes a proposal by HM Treasury (2003) for a fiscal stabilisation 
rule in which a discretionary fiscal reaction would be triggered when the 
output gap was expected to exceed a certain threshold in either direction away 
from the zero level (the suggested threshold was +/-1.5 percent). Such a rule 
has certain advantages above a rule in which fiscal policy continuously reacts 
to movements in the output gap. This is in particular the case when there are 
fixed costs for the private sector of adapting to changes in fiscal policy (such 
as a change in the VAT rate). Further, given the uncertainty about the size of 
the output gap, it may be better to only take action when developments appear 
to become rather extreme, which minimizes the risk of implementing a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. Finally, employing a trigger rule rather than a continuous 
rule would send a signal that the rule is not meant for fine-tuning, but rather to 
counteract persistent cyclical fluctuations. Obviously, with the trigger based on 
expected rather than actual output gap movements, many unexpected shocks 
would be missed. However, the risk of pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy 
actions would also be minimized and only the more persistent (and, arguably, 
more relevant) shocks will lead to discretionary action. 
The criteria for a proper discretionary fiscal policy are that the policy is trans-
parent and credible, and that it operates in a symmetric and timely manner. The 
latter two objectives are, in principle achieved by acting in response to ex-
pected output gap movements and by setting symmetric thresholds around a 
zero gap level. Of course, persistent over- or underestimation of the potential 
output level, as allegedly has happened in the seventies, could still lead to a de 
facto asymmetrically operating rule. The transparency requirement can be 
more easily met if the trigger is based on a single number. Of course, transpar-
ency also requires clarity about the specific actions that the government is 
going to take when the thresholds are exceeded. As far as the choice of the 
fiscal instrument is concerned, Woods expresses a preference for temporary 
changes in expenditure taxes. Empirical studies have shown that such changes 
can have profound effects on aggregate demand, although the effects tend to be 
rather short-lived and concentrated closer to the date when the changes are 
actually implemented rather than when they are announced. 
Over the past decade, major industrialised economies have enjoyed low eco-
nomic volatility. After providing summary statistics, Bill Martin and Robert 
Rowthorn (2005) try to explain what has caused the reduction in fluctuations 
in output growth and inflation. A better understanding of the sources of en-
hanced stability could inform us about how stability can be prolonged if it has 
been the result of improved economic policies and the likelihood that it will 
last if it is caused by a reduction in the size of exogenous economic shocks. 
Potential explanations of increased stability fall into three main categories: 
structural economic changes that promote stability, improved economic poli-
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cies and a reduction in the exogenous shocks hitting the economies. Martin and 
Rowthorn reject all explanations that fall into the first category – a shift from 
manufacturing to services, better inventory management and financial market 
deregulation allowing for better consumption smoothing. Given that the rise 
and fall of output volatility coincides with changes in inflation volatility, 
attention then turns to changes in the behaviour of inflation and the underlying 
policies. The data suggest that both inflation persistence and the response of 
inflation to output (the slope of the Phillips curve) have fallen in the past two 
decades. A source of such changes may be the increased credibility of inflation 
targets and central banks, leading to lower inflation expectations and less pass-
though of costs and past inflation movements into current price rises. As the 
authors show, enhanced credibility of monetary policy can lead to both lower 
inflation and lower output volatility. Other potential improvements may have 
been the relinquishing over direct price and income controls and better meas-
urement of spare capacity. 
To get a firmer grip on the sources of the greater stability, Martin and Rowthorn 
use a new method to decompose changes in volatility into changes in initial 
economic conditions, changes in economic behaviour (of both private sector and 
authorities) and changes in shocks. While the role of initial conditions generally 
is relatively small, changes in economic behaviour were the main source of the 
growth volatility reduction for the Euro area and Japan, while for the U.S. and 
the U.K. the main source were changes in shocks. Shocks are also the main 
driving force of lower inflation variability in the U.K. and Japan. Digging 
deeper, the changes in the shock components of output and inflation can be 
largely attributed to direct output, respectively inflation shocks. Yet, this is not 
the end of the story, since the obvious question then is, what causes these 
shocks? While, by definition, shocks are the unexplained part of a model, further 
empirical analysis indicates that the variances of both output and inflation shocks 
are increasing in the average inflation rate, thus again pointing to monetary 
policy as the main contributor to reducing fluctuations. Trying to look into the 
future, simulations show that a prolongation of the current low volatility situa-
tion requires current stable monetary policies to be continued and shocks not to 
increase substantially from those experienced recently. 
Let us turn attention to the insights New-Keynesian economics provides for the 
design of monetary policy. A key lesson is that under full price stability (zero 
inflation), losses arising from unwarranted price dispersions (as, for example, 
produced by staggered Calvo (1983) contracts in an inflationary environment) 
are minimized. According to the New-Keynesian view, the output gap should 
be defined as the difference between actual output and the (time varying) 
output level that prevails under fully flexible wages and prices. The flexible 
wage/price output level (the natural rate of output) fluctuates – for example, 
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owing to productivity or other supply shocks. It may be even more volatile 
than actual output under sticky prices. This view of the output gap contrasts 
sharply with the one traditionally adhered to by central bankers, who consider 
the output gap as the difference between actual output and some smoothed 
version of output (such as output following a time trend or output after the 
removal of the cycle using a Hodrick-Prescott filter). Predictably, central 
bankers would be very reluctant to target an output level that fluctuates. The 
obvious question then arises whether central bankers are wrong in their poli-
cies or whether New-Keynesian theorists overlook potential considerations 
that are relevant for central bankers in their policies. Alex Cukierman (2005) 
argues that the latter may well be the case. The fundamental explanation is a 
second-best argument, namely a pre-existing distortion (the presence of mo-
nopolistic competition) due to which the removal of nominal stickiness may 
actually reduce welfare. In such a case, targeting the flexible price level of 
output may no longer be optimal. 
Cukierman illustrates his argument by comparing the outcomes under flexible 
and sticky wages and prices in a simple static model that features productivity 
shocks. Under flexibility, nominal wages and prices are set after the realization 
of the productivity shock, while in the other case both are set before the shock 
takes place. Thus, in the latter case, the real wage cannot react to the shock 
realization. In both cases, a negative productivity shock causes a fall in profits, 
which, owing to a negative income effect, leads to less leisure and, thus, an 
increase in the labour supply. This mitigates the negative effect of the produc-
tivity shock on economic activity. However, in the case of flexibility, there is 
an additional effect on the labour supply caused by a fall in the real wage. As a 
result, in this case leisure is less volatile, but consumption is more volatile than 
under stickiness. Hence, the trade off between the two cases depends on the 
degree of risk aversion to consumption uncertainty relative to that for leisure 
uncertainty. Cukierman demonstrates through an example that there exist cases 
in which sticky wages and prices are welfare superior to flexible wages and 
prices. Moreover, he derives a formal criterion for this to be the case. Trans-
lated in terms of its policy implications, Cukierman’s argument provides 
support for central bankers to target a smoothed output level in the presence of 
nominal stickiness. Although the paper does not touch upon the issue of the 
observability of the shocks, one can speculate that the case for targeting a 
variable level of potential output becomes even weaker when supply shocks 
are only imperfectly observed and, hence, the actual level of potential output 
cannot be established precisely. 
In his paper Jeffrey Amato assesses the problems in implementing the New-
Keynesian proposals for setting the interest rate in the daily conduct of mone-
tary policy. The task to steer the economy towards the flexible wage/price 
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output level (the natural rate of output) is equivalent to the task of equalising 
the actual real rate of interest with the so-called “natural rate of interest.” This 
concept, initially introduced by Knut Wicksell, and revived in the New-
Keynesian approach, characterizes the real interest rate that would be realised 
in a flexible price rational expectations equilibrium. This suggests that actual 
interest policy might be framed in terms of the natural rate of interest as a key 
benchmark indicator for monetary policy. The fact that the natural rate cannot 
be observed, however, casts doubt on its practical relevance. Amato presents 
evidence that simple measures of the real rate gap have not been good indica-
tors of aggregate price changes. He shows that uncertainty about the level of 
the long-run natural rate may have a much bigger impact on the setting of the 
nominal interest rate than uncertainty about the desired sensitivities of policy 
to inflation and output fluctuations. 
In view of these uncertainties, it has been suggested that central banks should 
follow a rule specified solely in terms of observable variables. In some New-
Keynesian model specifications, inflation turns out to be a sufficient statistic 
for monetary policy in which case the choice of an appropriate rule is com-
paratively simple. However, as Amato points out, this result is likely not to be 
robust to more realistic settings. First, in the presence of nominal wage sticki-
ness, monetary policy should not only respond to price inflation (see also the 
contribution by Cukierman). Second, if nominal rigidities are not caused by 
staggered prices but are due to imperfect information, the information content 
of the inflation rate may be distorted. Finally, financial market imperfections 
(resulting, for example, in varying risk premia) may affect the link between the 
real rate gap and other variables in the economy. Amato argues that further 
research is needed about the impact of financial frictions on the natural rate 
and the monetary transmission mechanism.  
Charles Goodhart and Boris Hofmann assess the empirical performance of the 
New Keynesian model. They provide an extensive survey of econometric estima-
tions of the model and show that, up to now, empirical evidence is rather mixed. 
According to the theory, the key equations to be estimated (both the Phillips curve 
and the IS curve) should be purely forward looking (that is, they should only 
depend on expected future variables). But econometric estimations with hybrid 
specifications (also allowing – in a rather ad hoc way – for backward-looking 
expectations) typically result in a much better performance. Nevertheless, even the 
hybrid versions show significant problems with the model. There is considerable 
unresolved debate about the mix of forward- and backward-looking behaviour. 
Furthermore, the key monetary transmission parameters are often poorly identified. 
For example, empirical research often fails to find a significant negative effect of 
the real interest rate on the output gap.  
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Goodhart and Hofmann argue that the poor performance is due to the omission 
of important variables that provide information about future output (such as the 
exchange rate or property and share prices), and about supply shocks (such as 
oil or other commodity and import prices). To fix this problem, they enrich the 
specification with proxies for supply shocks and for information about future 
output. Overall, the estimated hybrid representation of the economy turns out 
to offer a plausible description of the elements affecting both inflation and the 
business cycle. Their results suggest that a richer specification of the empirical 
New Keynesian model appears to be needed in order to obtain more plausible 
estimates of key macroeconomic relationships. 
In a stimulating panel discussion at the conference, Rick van der Ploeg pointed 
out that even though there has been considerable progress in understanding some 
crucial elements of Keynesian economics, key features are still not yet modelled 
in a satisfactory way. This has motivated him to write a critical review of the 
macroeconomic debates, putting the New-Keynesian approach into a broader 
historical perspective. In this final paper of this conference issue, he first gives a 
detailed historical account of the various schools of macroeconomic thought– 
starting with classical and old-Keynesian macroeconomic theories up to the Real 
Business Cycle model. Then, he points out the key contributions of New 
Keynesian Economics from this perspective. By departing from a competitive 
framework, this theory captures wage and price sluggishness and aggregate 
demand externalities in a stochastic dynamic framework, based on explicit 
micro-foundations. The forward-looking nature of the model gives a key role to 
expectations and commitment. Policy actions today can have a strong influence 
on the economy when there is a credible commitment to a specific future policy 
path. The careful micro-foundations allow for an exact welfare analysis (with the 
loss function derived as a second-order approximation to a proper micro-founded 
utility function of the representative agent).  
However, as van der Ploeg argues, these advantages come at the cost that some 
essential features stressed by Keynes are not captured in the New-Keynesian 
model. According to van der Ploeg, the main deficiencies are the inability to 
predict a pro-cyclical real wage in the face of demand shocks, as well as the 
absence of inventories, credit constraints and bankruptcies (financial frictions) 
in explaining the business cycle. Furthermore, labour market rationing, being a 
key Keynesian feature, is not captured. In reality, unemployment is experi-
enced as a catastrophic event, with the risk concentrated among specific 
groups in the population. Therefore, a proper modelling and a proper welfare 
analysis would require heterogeneity of agents and the consideration of distri-
butional issues. According to van der Ploeg, economists still have a long way 
to go before they capture the most important ideas of John Maynard Keynes 
and his followers. 
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The contributions in this issue demonstrate the substantial progress that we 
have made in understanding Keynesian features: the views about stabilisation 
today are very different from those in the textbooks of the 1960s. Using well-
structured dynamic models and introducing real life features such as price 
stickiness and imperfect competition, we have made progress in understanding 
the economic effects of the various types of shocks, economic structures, 
market imperfections and institutions. Modern macroeconomics provides a 
sound welfare theoretical basis for analysing different policies. It shows that a 
deep recession causes substantial welfare losses. It also provides a new main 
reason for stabilising inflation – the gains from overcoming relative price 
distortions due to staggered prices.  
Nevertheless, a number of important unresolved challenges remain. It turns out 
to be extremely difficult to generate models that show a similar degree of 
persistence as observed in the data. So far, there has been no agreement on one 
of the most challenging questions: what are the main sources driving business 
cycles? The fact that the empirical performance of the New Keynesian models 
is significantly improved, when additional frictions are introduced, indicates 
how difficult it is to model inter-temporal considerations within the current 
infinite-horizon framework. The model does not seem to capture unemploy-
ment adequately. Movements in labour market are modelled as movements 
along the individual labour supply curve. However, as a stylised fact, short-run 
fluctuations in activity primarily lead to variations in employment rather than 
changes in working hours. In reality, unemployment is mostly involuntary, 
while, moreover, unemployment risk tends to be concentrated among specific 
groups, such as the low skilled. Consequently, distributive aspects are crucial 
for understanding the welfare gains from stabilisation, even though such 
aspects are not captured in representative agent models. This suggests an 
additional motive for stabilising the business cycle, because such a policy may 
help in mitigating incentive problems inherent in social assistance programs. 
The editors hope that this conference issue will convince the reader about the 
importance of stabilisation policy and that it will stimulate further research in 
this area. 
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